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 Abstract 
This thesis studies the influence of national political systems on the powers of international 
parliamentary institutions (IPI). It adds empirical results to a field that has been primarily 
studied theoretically. The thesis tests two hypotheses. First it studies if the power of IPI’s is 
positively influenced by the power of member states’ legislatives. Second it studies if the 
power of IPI’s is negatively influenced by the power of member states’ executives. The study 
uses a nested analysis to study these hypotheses. The first part of the study, a large N analysis 
shows that the results of both hypotheses are unsatisfactory and both are rejected.  On the 
basis of this rejection a case study of four IPI’s is conducted. This small N analysis finds that 
IPI power is influenced by democratic norms in member states under certain conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction and Research Question 
In the second half of the twentieth century more and more decisions are being made on an 
international level. A problem with this political internationalization is the democratic deficit 
of international organizations (IOs) (Kraft-Kasack 2008). International parliamentary 
institutions (IPI’s) or supranational parliaments are often employed by IOs in an attempt to 
decrease this democratic deficit.  The first IPI that had substantial power, The European 
parliament, was founded in 1957 and in the footsteps of this reasonably successful experiment 
many other IPI’s were set up. According to International Democracy Watch there are 46 IPI’s 
in the world today (IDW 2016).  
The core functions of a parliament are consultative, appointments, oversight, legislative and 
budgetary (Cofelice and Stavridis, 2014). The powers of an IPI to execute these roles vary 
considerably. The European Parliament (EP) has a great number of opportunities to execute 
these main functions. Many other IPI’s, however, lack the power to achieve the main 
objectives.  The reasons behind this difference in power are major discussion points between 
political scientists (Cofelice and Stavridis 2014; Karuuombe 2008; Kissling 2011; Malamud 
and De Sousa 2007; Nzewi 2014; Ogbonnaya and Ogujiuba 2015; Rocabert et al. 2014; Šabič 
2008). This thesis will contribute to this discussion by specifically looking at this power 
difference and asking why certain IPI’s have more power than other IPI’s.  
This thesis will specifically study the role of domestic political systems on IPI power. As 
regional integration is primarily an intergovernmental affair it is critical to investigate the role 
of specific political systems on the development of IPI power (Terlinden 2004). Domestic 
political systems tend to influence the degree of power of IPI (Karuuombe 2008).  
 
Karuuombe notes that the process of establishment and strengthening an IPI is a product of 
domestic struggles between the executive and parliaments over political space and influence 
(Karuuombe 2008, 23). These domestic struggles are replicated and extended in the battle 
over strengthening the fundamental powers of IPI’s. Domestic executives have the tendency 
to make deals on a regional level that in some cases do not need to be ratified by the domestic 
parliaments. By using these actions executives are in some way sabotaging the political 
system (Terlinden 2004). Domestic parliaments rather like to have a strong regional 
parliament that can influence regional legislation with democratic input and ensure 
parliamentary sovereignty (Terlinden 2004). On the other hand there is a case to be made that 
the more power goes to regional parliaments the more power domestic parliaments lose. The 
question that needs to be asked is: How is the power of an IPI affected by the power 
differences between the executive and legislative in member states. The thesis will use a 
mixed method analysis to study this question. This means that first a large N analysis will be 
conducted to test two hypotheses. The second part of the thesis will be a small N analysis of 
which the form is based on the results of the large N analysis. If the LNA shows that the 
hypotheses are confirmed, the SNA will further the robustness of the theory. If the LNA 
shows that the hypotheses are refuted, the SNA will find rival explanations that could explain 
the differences in power between IPIs.  
 
 
 
 
  
Concepts and Theoretical framework of the hypotheses 
The following part will first expand on the concepts, and end with the theoretical framework 
in which the hypotheses are embedded.  The most important concept that needs to be defined 
in this study is arguablally the concept international parliamentary institution (IPI). The 
concept IPI is an overarching concept that includes a multitude of international parliamentary 
institutions. There are two general methods of identifying IPI’s. The first method is 
identification by institutional form. Cutler identifies four forms of IPI: Congress, assembly, 
parliament and legislature (2001). Each stand for a more developed form of 
institutionalization and does not refer to specific names of parliaments. Although the first two 
types can in fact do valuable work it is struggling to identify the as parliaments. Often these 
assemblies are modelled as symposiums, conferences or discussion fora and lack the basic 
parliamentary rules and structures (De Puig 2010). It is therefore hard to use these groups in 
this study. Another form of identification is done by Rocabert et al. who identify IPI’s three 
qualities: 1) transcends borders 2) has a collegial organization 3) some directly or indirectly 
chosen members (2014).   This study will follow a different form of conceptualizing IPI’s that 
also includes what IPI’s actually do (Šabič 2008). Following Cofelice and Stavridis, Šabič and 
De Puig this study makes a distinction in International Parliamentary Associations (IPA) and 
International Parliamentary Organizations (IPO) (Cofelice and Stavridis 2014; Šabič 2008; De 
Puig 2010). IPO’s are organs of international organizations composed of parliamentarians 
(Šabič 2008). Examples of IPO’s are the EP and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (PACE). IPA’s are organized in various ways and irrespective of how they are 
constituted and to what extend the appointment reflects the political spectrum in home 
parliaments (Šabič 2008).  The form of IPA’s varies enormously.  
Some IPA’s like the parliamentary assembly of NATO are highly structured, some IPA’s, 
such as Euronest
1
, have a very loose structure and some, such as the Parliamentary Assembly 
for Nuclear Disarmament are part of an NGO (Šabič 2008).  This study will primarily use 
IPO’s as it is expected they have or are able to have a saying in the policy making process of 
IO’s.  
In defining the concept of IPI power this thesis will follow Cofelice and Stavridis’ five factors 
of IPI power: Consultative, budgetary, appointment, legislative and oversight (2014). Cofelice 
and Stavridis use the following definitions for the five factors.  
1) Consultative: “Regional organization decision-making bodies are obliged to 
consult the IPI before taking a decision. Subsequently the IPI is informed if the 
decision is rejected or accepted.”  
2) Budgetary: “The IPI can reject the budget proposal.”  
3) Appointment: “The IPI has the right to appoint the decision-making bodies of the 
IO.” 
4) Legislative: “The IPI has joint legislative powers in all relevant subject fields. IPI 
can initiate legislative procedures and set the agenda for the organization.”  
5) Oversight: “The IPO can adopt motions of censure on the activities of other bodies 
that are compelled to resign (Cofelice and Stavridis 2014).” 
In addition to these five factors it can be expected that the budget of an IPI influences its 
powers. A higher budget allows for a larger and more structured secretariat and administration 
and subsequently a more effective parliament. A higher budget can also mean that the IPI has 
more autonomy to set its priorities vis-à-vis the IO (Rocabert et al. 2014). 
 
                                                            
1 Forum in which members of the EP and national parliaments of Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia participate.   
Conceptualizing legislative power can be done in numerous ways.  It can be done be dividing 
systems up in parliamentary, semi- presidential and presidential systems. This however brings 
considerable difficulty. Elgie notes that there is a problem with utilizing semi-presidential 
systems for empirical research because the power of presidents varies in different semi 
presidential systems (2016). For example Russia has a very strong president where Slovenia 
has a very weak president (Elgie 2016). Fish and Kroenig also state that using 
conceptualization gives categorical instead of empirical data which is not useful when 
conducting empirical research (2009).  To ensure the concept of legislative power can be used 
in the empirical research this thesis follows the conceptualization of Fish and Kroenig. They 
find four factors of legislative power that are subdivided in smaller specific capacities (Fish 
and Kroenig 2009). Influence over the executive is a capacity of legislative power. An 
example of such a capacity is if the legislature can make a vote of no confidence in the 
government. A second factor of legislative power is the autonomy of the legislative. Is it, for 
example, immune from dissolution by the government? The third factor of legislative power 
is specific powers such as the power to grant amnesty. Finally, the capacity of the legislative 
is a factor of legislative power. This can be, for example, seen in the amount of staff a 
parliamentarian has (Fish and Kroenig 2009).  
To ensure we can use the concept of executive power in an empirical research this study will 
use a formal concept of executive power i.e. the power that has been given to the executive by 
the constitution. In this thesis the executive can mean the government, prime minister or 
president. The following are the seven factors of executive power (CCP 2016):  
1) “The power to initiate legislation” 
 2) “The power to issue decrees” 
3) “The power to initiate constitutional amendments” 
 4) “The power to declare states of emergency” 
 5) “Power to veto legislation”  
 6) “The power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation”  
7) “The power to dissolve the legislature (CCP 2016; Elkins et al. 2012)”. 
This thesis will study to what extent political systems of member states influence the amount 
of power of an IPI. Broad representation and participation are the main principles that many 
IPI’s strive to achieve (Nzewi 2014).  Nzewi argues that these principles can only successfully 
work if there is some regional and domestic congruence on these values (2014). He uses the 
example of Africa and the African Union. African states are still ranked quite low in 
democracy indices and there are many doubts about the sincerity and duration of democratic 
attempts in certain African regimes (Nzewi 2014). Nzewi contrast this model with the 
European parliament and argues that because European states adhere to democratic principles, 
adoption of these principles on a regional level is much easier (2014).  Terlinden argues that 
domestic values are not the only reason domestic parliaments support regional parliaments. 
He states that regional parliaments give domestic parliamentarians the chance to enhance 
political participation and their influence. Furthermore, the opening of the domestic political 
space gives room to international scrutiny of the political system and the subsequent 
enlargement of democratic values (Terlinden 2004). Karuuombe also states that strong 
national executives lead to weak regional parliaments; national parliaments are often bypassed 
in policy making and are essentially rubber- stamp institutions (2008). He gives the example 
of the South African Development Community where national parliaments are bypassed in 
ratifying treaties and protocols and this is, according to Karuuombe, harmful for the 
deepening of IPI’s (2008).  
 However, it must be noted that power struggles between domestic and regional parliaments 
are not uncommon. Regional parliaments may ‘steal’ certain legislative power of national 
parliaments when they become more supranational. Terlinden however states that for a best 
possible outcome for both national and regional parliaments cooperation is necessary 
(Terlinden 2004).  
As said before the process of regional integration is often an extension of the domestic power 
struggle between parliament and executive. In many developing countries the struggle for 
political rights and political space is often still in early stages. The executive is still very 
strong and parliaments are bypassed in policy making processes. Domestic parliaments are 
fighting for more (democratic) influence.  One way of achieving this is lobbying for a 
stronger regional parliament where political influence can be gained (Karuuombe 2008; 
Terlinden 2004). However a domestic power struggle can also lead to less regional integration. 
Large internal conflict leads to a weakening of external relations and efforts for more regional 
integration become less important (Nzewi 2014) 
These are some of the theoretical claims that argue that a national system wherein the 
parliament is strong leads to powerful IPI’s. Although the theoretical evidence is well 
documented, empirical data on the effect of the power of the domestic legislative on the 
power of IPI is still lacking. This leads to the first hypothesis that this thesis will study.   
Hypothesis I: IPI power is positively influenced by the power of the legislative in member 
states’ political systems.  
 
 
When arguing that IPI power is positively influenced by the power of member states’ 
legislative it seems logical that the opposite claim can be made about the influence of member 
states’ executive  on IPI power.  
Where norm transfer from a domestic level to an international level is active in the case of the 
legislative it can also be the case for the executive. In cases where strong executives dominate 
the regional integration process, bypassing national parliaments, important legislative norms 
like oversight are kept out of the integration process (Karuuombe, 2008). In strong 
presidential regimes the survival and authority of the government are often independent of 
parliamentary mandate. Strong executives can handle largely without oversight and scrutiny 
on budgets and appointments. Malamud and the Sousa argue that this behavior, that is very 
beneficial for the executive on a domestic level, is replicated on a regional level (Malamud 
and De Sousa, 2007). This results in IPI staying essentially rubberstamp institutions.  
Although arguments have been made that executive dominance does not hinder regional 
integration, most notably in the case of Mercosur (Giardini, 2010), these executive led IO’s 
often lack strong IPI’s (Malamud, 2005). This can be explained by the aforementioned 
argumentation but also by the hesitation of domestic executives to include a veto-power, like 
a strong IPI, in the institutional build-up of an IO that can block presidential interventions. 
These theoretical argumentation leads to the second hypothesis of this thesis:  
Hypothesis II: IPI power is negatively influenced by the power of the executive in member 
states’ political systems. 
 
 
 
Case Selection 
Seawright and Gerring give two main objectives in selecting cases: Obtaining a representative 
sample (2008, 296). Second obtaining useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical 
interest (2008, 296). To have a representative number of cases the sample needs to be 
reasonably large. In the selection of cases for this specific study it is important that the cases 
have legislative powers or have the possibility to attain them. This thesis will therefore 
primarily focus on IPI’s that are linked to international organizations, or IPO’s. These IPO’s 
have more available data on legislative functions. Furthermore, they are more suitable to 
study as they can show forms of a democratic deficit. Examples are the European Parliament, 
Pan-African Parliament and PARLASUR. IPA’s like the Inter- Parliamentary Union or 
Euronest will not be included in the study.  
The goal of the statistical part of this study is to confirm or disconfirm the relationship of the 
power of parliament and the power of the executive in domestic political systems and the 
power of an IPI. To get a representative sample over which enough data is available this 
analysis will be a (Relatively) large N analysis. As said earlier the study will use IPI’s that are 
dependent on an IO. According to International Democracy Watch there are 40 of these 
dependent IPI’s (IDW 2016). Before the discussion of the case selection method it needs to be 
noted that not all of these IPI’s have enough available data that can be used in a statistical 
analysis. Following the case selection of Cofelice and Stavridis the LNA includes 22 cases.  
Ideally typical cases will be chosen to specifically look at the processes that lie behind the 
causal relationship (mt-SNA) or to investigate which other variables influence the dependent 
variable (mb-SNA). In an mb-SNA cases will be chosen that are on-the-line and off-the-line.  
 
Research design, Operationalization & Methods of data collection 
The design of this study will be a mixed method design or a nested design study. The nested 
research design was introduced by Lieberman in 2005 and combines statistical analysis with 
in-depth qualitative research (2005, 435). The nested analysis starts with a large N analysis 
(LNA) and ends with a small N analysis (SNA) of one or more cases (Lieberman 2005, 436). 
The goal of such a mixed research is a larger analytic ‘payoff’ than when one uses only LNA 
or SNA. Furthermore in a nested analysis each step guides and gives directions for the next. 
LNA gives insight in other explanations and helps motivate the case selection for SNA 
(Lieberman 2005, 436). Lieberman gives an ideal model for a nested analysis that this thesis 
will, as far as possible, try to emulate. The study will start with a preliminary LNA analysis, if 
the results of this analysis are ‘robust and satisfactory’ the next step is a so called model 
testing SNA analysis, if the results are not ‘robust and satisfactory’ the next step is a model 
building SNA Analysis (Lieberman 2005, 438). Because we have a strong hypothesis and 
good data the LNA analysis can be seen as a hypothesis testing method. For the LNA analysis 
this thesis will use a linear regression model, the next chapter will go deeper into the specifics 
of a linear regression model.  
The next step of the study is the intensive SNA analysis of one or more cases. The goal of 
such a SNA analysis is to examine questions that have been left open by the LNA and try to 
answer them through analysis of processes within the case (Lieberman 2005, 440-441). This 
is done by examining documentation from within the case that gives important information 
about the influence of the parliamentary power in domestic systems on the power of an IPI. If 
the hypothesis is confirmed by the LNA the next step isa  model testing analysis (mt-SNA).  
 
The goal of the SNA in this case is to further the ‘robustness’ of the results (Lieberman 2005, 
442). In practice this means a more specific analysis of the events and processes that lie 
behind the cause and effect. When the hypothesis is refuted the next step is model building 
SNA (mb-SNA). Mb-SNA is an inductive model of analysis that aims to develop new well – 
specified theoretical accounts and is used to identify measures that are valid and reliable 
indicators of the analytical constructs of the theoretical model (Lieberman 2005, 443). The 
goal of an mb-SNA analysis is to re-examine all theoretically strong prepositions and looking 
for example into rival explanations (Lieberman 2005, 443).  
The quantitative part of this study will use three main variables. The independent variables are 
the amount of power of domestic parliaments and the amount of power of domestic 
executives. The dependent variable is the amount of power an IPI has. In the 
operationalization of the independent variables executive power and power of the legislative 
we have a few options. The first option is to classify the institutions in certain categories 
ranging from parliamentary to presidential and including several hybrid forms of semi-
presidentialism (Cheibub et al. 2013; Lijphart 2012;). The problem that arises with 
operationalizing the variable in this way is that specific power differences within these 
categorizations are overlooked. (Cheibub et al. 2013; Fortin 2013; Fruhstorfer 2014). What is 
of most interest to this study is where the power within specific political systems lies. 
Naturally specific interest goes out to the power of the legislative and executive.  
The best way to measure power is the use of a continues metric of powers (Elgie 2016; Fish 
and Kroenig 2009).  The power of the domestic legislative is measured with the legislative 
power index of the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP). This index is based on a set of 
32 items that Fish and Kroenig use to measure parliamentary power (Fish and Kroenig 2009). 
The index uses the mean of the 32 binary variables and ranges them from 0 (weakest) to 1 
(strongest) (CCP 2016). The data of the 32 variables is found in the constitutions (CCP 2016). 
Consequently the index measures the formal, de jure, power of national legislatives. 
Questions can be raised about the amount of power the index gives to some parliaments. 
Countries like Egypt and Eritrea score relatively high on legislative power but in reality these 
parliaments are far from strong. Although the dataset is not flawless at this moment it is the 
most extensive and up to date dataset on legislative power. 
To find the amount of power of executives we look at the way heads of state can enact 
legislative proposals (Elkins et al. 2012; Saiegh 2009). To find executive power, an 
understanding of formal powers of executives in the process of bargaining with parliaments is 
necessary (Elkins et al. 2012). In this case the executive can be the president, prime-minister 
or the whole government This study uses the index of the CCP that measure executive power 
on a scale of 0-7 where 0 is weak and 7 is strong (2016). This index measures the formal 
power of executives as written down in the constitution. The index finds seven items that are 
present or absent in constitutions. These items represent the formal powers of the executive in 
the process of bargaining with the legislative (CCP 2016; Elkins et al. 2012):  
1) “The power to initiate legislation”. 
2) “The power to issue decrees”. 
3) “The power to initiate constitutional amendments”. 
4) “The power to declare a state of emergency”. 
5) “Power to veto legislation”.  
6) “The power to challenge the constitutionality of legislation”.  
7) “The power to dissolve the legislature” (CCP 2016; Elkins et al. 2012)”. 
 
 
Cofelice and Stavridis find 23 IPO’s that have, in some capacity, the authority to actively or 
passively influence policy making within the IO (2014). The quantitative part of this study 
will be based on this selection of IPI’s excluding the now defunct EurAsEc IPA.2 This study 
will operationalize the variable IPI power by using the five functions that Cofelice and 
Stavridis use to measure the variable. Cofelice and Stavridis use the following functions to 
measure IPI power: Legislative, consultative, appointments, budgetary and oversight 
(Cofelice and Stavridis 2014). These functions are measured on a hierarchical five point scale 
where 0 is weakest and 5 is strongest.
 3
  Although this study could also use the indicators that 
the CCP uses to measure the power of IPI’s, the updated dataset of Cofelice and Stavridis was 
chosen for a few reasons. The Cofelice and Stavridis dataset was specifically designed to 
measure IPI power (2014). Therefore, the five point scale gives a more realistic view of IPI 
power. Many items on the 32 item list that the CCP use to measure legislative power are not 
applicable to IPI’s. Items such as the power to appoint a prime minister declare war or grant 
pardon or amnesty, are not applicable to IPI’s (Fish and Kroenig 2009). The second reason is 
that the time frame for this study is limited.  There is not enough time to measure such a large 
number of variables for each of the 22 IPI’s.   
Some factors are missing from Cofelice and Stavridis’ measurement of IPI power. Rocabert et 
al. give a much broader definition, maybe a too broad definition, of IPI power but they 
include one factor that is essential in measuring IPI power that Cofelice and Stavridis exclude: 
Budget size (2014).  
 
 
                                                            
2 See Appendix I for the 22 IPI’s. Cofelice and Stavridis included the now defunct EurAsEc IPA.  
3 See Appendix II for operationalization of the 5 point scale. 
Budget size considerably influences the operating strength of IPI’s by giving them the means 
to further institutionalize and giving them an amount of autonomy (Rocabert et al. 2014). 
Furthermore, it expands the capacity of IPI’s to expand and deepen the influence and impact 
of its policies (Rocabert et al. 2014). For the measurement of budget the index uses relative 
budget of the IPI’s in relation to that of the IO.4 That way it is easier to study a more realistic 
measurement of budget. It shows the amount of value an IO gives to its IPI and the extent in 
which it allows its IPI to become more autonomous. Although the choice was made to use 
relative budget it could be argued that absolute budget also can be used in the LNA. Relative 
budget obscures the actual budget of some IPI’s. A good example here is the EP. Because the 
budget of the EU is so large it is not expected that the EP receives a large percentage of this 
budget, so the relative score of the EP is low. But, if we look at the absolute budget of the EP 
we see that it is many times larger than any of the other IPI’s.  To be sure an analysis was also 
done with PPI including absolute budget. This analysis showed that including absolute budget 
did not change the results.
5
        
The variable IPI power was coded by a group of fellow students from the thesis course. It was 
made on the basis of the technique used by Cofelice and Stavridis to measure the 
Parliamentary Power Index (PPI). The group added updated data until 2016 and added the 
factor budget to the PPI.
 6
  The PPI shows the power of an IPI on 0-1 scale where 0 is weakest 
and 1 is strongest.  What was added to the PPI index was the budget of the IPI relative to the 
budget of the IO.  
 
                                                            
4 See Appendix III for the measurement of relative IPI budget. 
5 See Appendix IV for the results of this analysis. 
6 See Appendix V for the IPI power Index 2016. 
Not every IPI had sufficient data available to measure this new PPI but we managed to get 
data from nine IPI’s.7 For these parliamentary assemblies a Parliamentary Power score (PP) 
was calculated that includes relative budget. For the other IPI’s the updated PPI of Cofelice 
and Stavridis was used.  The new PPI was made by adjusting the formula of Cofelice and 
Stavridis to include budget:  
PP =
αC + βO + γA + δB + εL + ϵR
6(α + β + γ + δ + ε + ϵ)
 
 
To assess if executive power and legislative power really affect IPI power it is necessary to 
include a control variable in the LNA. The control variable is thought to have an influence on 
both the independent and dependent variable. The control variable for the LNA part of this 
study is level of democracy. Level of democracy can have both an influence on the power of 
an IPA as well as on the power of the legislative and the executive. The higher the levels of 
democracy are in a country the higher the power of legislative is expected to be in domestic 
political systems.  On the other hand it is expected that countries that have a higher level of 
democracy have some sort of checks and balances process in place that curtails the power of 
the executive to some extent. It can also be expected that the level of democracy influences 
the power of an IPI as more democratic states try to emulate democratic norms on an 
international level. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index is used to measure the 
level of democracy per country. Although this is not the most extensive database available it 
does measure the democracy levels of nations on a considerably extensive scale (EIU 2015). 
 
                                                            
7 Nordic Council, European Parliament, East African Legislative Assembly, European Free Trade Association PC, 
Economic Community of Central African States, Benelux, Pan African Parliament, Council of Europe and 
Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. 
The qualitative part of the study, the SNA, will consist of a case study. Four cases will be 
discussed. The case selection of the SNA will be done primarily on the basis of the dependent 
variable with a considerable difference in the scores of the explanatory variables (Lieberman 
2005). The case selection will be done on the basis of the “on-the-line/off-the-line” or 
typical/diverse principles (Lieberman 2005; Seawright and Gerring 2008). For example, both 
the member states of the EP as well as the Benelux parliament have legislatives of the same 
power. However the EP is a very strong IPI and the Benelux is a weak IPI. On the other side 
of the spectrum we see that both CEMAC parliament and the CSTO parliament member states 
have lower legislative power but they both differ considerably in power. The sources that are 
consulted for the SNA are official documents and treaties as well as secondary sources such 
as articles and other scientific material.  
 
Method of data analysis 
As said before this thesis will make use of a nested data analysis. This means that data will be 
analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative analysis will consist of a 
linear regression analysis. This form helps in researching not only the correlation between the 
independent and dependent variables in the hypothesis but also leads us to look at the 
influence of the control variables on the dependent variable.  
The analysis will be done in SPSS. The outcome of the regression analysis will lead to a 
qualitative analysis of a smaller amount of cases. The specifics of these qualitative analyses 
are discussed in the previous chapter. The case selection for the SNA is done by looking at the 
results of the LNA and selecting typical cross- relational cases.  
 
Large N Analysis 
 
The table below explains the influence of the independent variables mean power of the 
legislative and level of democracy on the dependent variable IPI power. The averages of each 
of the legislative powers of IPI member states were measured. We expected to see a relatively 
high correlation between the variables. However, the correlation between the variables is not 
very high with an r value of 0.187. When we look at the r
2
 only 0.035% of the variation is 
explained by the regression line and when adjusted to the number of cases the r
2
 becomes 
negative -0.067. The addition of level of democracy does not sufficiently explain the change 
in IPI power.  Furthermore, the significance of the test is p>0.05 namely 0.444 for legislative 
power and 0.937 for level of democracy, therefore the results are not significant. It could be 
argued that significance is not relevant because the researched sample is the population and 
the population is by definition representative (Argyrous, 2011). But in that case we can only 
make statements on this specific population at this specific point in time. Because the results 
are not significant and the r
2
 is very low the hypothesis is rejected 
Table 1: Linear regression model of IPI power 
                                                                 Model 1. 
(Constant)                                                    0.650 
                                                                    (0.248) 
Power of the legislative                               0.622 
                                                                    (0.846) 
Level of democracy                                    -0.002 
                                                                    (0.023) 
 
R                                                                   0.187   
R
2
                                                                                                   0.035 
Adj. R
2                                                                                      
-0.067 
N                                                                         22 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
  
In the second table the results of the test of hypothesis II are reported. The averages of 
executive power of member states were taken per IPI to measure executive power. It was 
expected that the correlation between the independent variable and the dependent variable 
would be relatively negative. However, with an R score of 0.226 the correlation is positive. 
The r
2
 is slightly positive at 0.051 and the adjusted r
2
 is -0.049. Again a very low percentage 
of the variation is explained by the regression line. The accuracy of the prediction is very low.  
Level of democracy cannot sufficiently explain the changes in IPI power.  Furthermore, the 
results are not significant (P>0.05). On the basis of these results hypothesis II is also rejected, 
the influence of executive power on IPI power is negligible.  
Table 2: Linear regression model of IPI Power 
                                                                 Model 2. 
(Constant)                                                    0.642 
                                                                    (0.440) 
Power of the executive                               -0.062   
                                                                    (0.063) 
Level of democracy                                    -0.012 
                                                                    (0.027) 
 
R                                                                   0.226   
R
2
                                                                                                   0.051 
Adj. R
2                                                                                      
-0.049 
N                                                                         22 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
 
 
 
 
Small  N Analysis    
The second step of this study involves a more intensive analysis of a number of cases. The 
form of this small N analysis follows the format of the nested analysis of Lieberman that was 
discussed earlier (2005). Because both hypotheses were rejected in the LNA the study will go 
forward with a model building SNA.  One of the main starting points of this study is the idea 
that norms that are strong on a domestic level are also strong on an international level. The 
idea was that especially domestic democratic norms like a strong parliament and controlled 
executive would influence the adoption of democratic norms on an international level. The 
LNA shows that this is not the case. The SNA consists of a case study of four IPI’s which two 
are strong and two are weak. The IPI’s will be divided on the power of the legislative. The 
cases are chosen on the basis of the scatterplot in table 3. The strong parliaments are the 
CEMAC parliament and EP and the weak parliaments are the Benelux Parliament and PA-
CSTO.  
Table 3: Scatterplot of the results of a linear regression analysis between IPI power 
(Relative budget) and mean legislative power.    
 
 
Benelux Parliament 
The Benelux is an IO wherein the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg work together in 
the fields of economic integration, security, traffic and the environment (Benelux 2008
a
). The 
main goal of the Benelux is to have a pioneering role within the European Union and to 
strengthen the bonds of the member countries (Benelux 2008
a
). The Benelux parliament is the 
parliamentary assembly of the Benelux. It consists of 49 members that are also 
parliamentarians of the domestic parliaments (Beneluxparlement 2016). The parliament has 
three main objectives: Recommending policies in the field of economic and border crossing 
cooperation, cooperation with other regional parliaments such as the Baltic Assembly and the 
Nordic Council and informing the national governments trends in the domestic parliaments 
(Beneluxparlement 2016).  
The Benelux Parliament scores a 2 for consultative functions, a 1 for budget oversight and a 3 
for relative budget. The absolute budget of the Benelux however is only 8 million and scores 
only a 1 out of 5. The PP of the Benelux is only 0.152 which is one of the lowest scores in the 
dataset. On mean legislative power the parliament scores 0.333 and the democratic scores of 
the member states averages 8.576 on a scale of 10 which is one of the highest scores. Where 
do these democratic norms return in the Benelux?  
One of the possible explanatory factors in the case of the Benelux is the existence of the 
European Parliament. More investments were made to implement democratic oversight on a 
larger, European level, then on the comparatively small Benelux parliament. Where the EP 
transformed in a directly elected parliament, the Benelux parliament remained weak with 
delegated parliamentarians. The Benelux has also been transformed into a different 
organization. In the context of a broadening EU, the Benelux has been transformed into 
deliberation platform where national executives meet before EU summits and agree on 
policies that are beneficial for the Benelux Countries (Benelux 2008
b
).  
However, discussions on the deepening of the powers of the Benelux Parliament are ongoing. 
In 2015 a revised treaty on the parliament was implemented that expanded her powers and 
expressed the wish to expand the powers of the parliament further (Benelux 2015).  The 
parliament gained marginal budgetary oversight but essentially it remained a relatively weak 
parliament (Benelux 2015). Because an overarching more powerful parliament, the EP, is in 
place the Benelux Parliament is unlike to gain extra powers. The regional democratic 
functions are already executed by the EP and a strong Benelux Parliament would essentially 
perform similar tasks. The overlap of parliaments can even create a ‘democratic fatigue’ 
(Kissling 2011; Meyer 2008).  
The same can arguably be said about other regional parliaments in Europe, such as the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), Central 
European Initiative (CEI) and even the European Free Trade Agreement parliamentary 
committee (EFTA). In the case of PABSEC, the countries that were once committed to 
regional integration in the Black Sea region have diverted their integration and trade efforts to 
the EU.  For most member states trade with the EU is more important than trade within the 
Black Sea Region and as such integration efforts have been diverted to the EU (Hajizada and 
Marciacq 2013).  The main goals of the CEI are “supporting member states on their path 
towards European integration” and “promoting EU standards among CEI members” (CEI 
2014). The main integration efforts are focused on the EU, the CEI parliaments only function 
is to coordinate these efforts (CEI 2014). Again the primacy lies with the EU.  
 
 
 
Although the members of the EFTA are officially not members of the EU their bonds are very 
tight. Both Switzerland and Norway participate extensively in EU programs and the economic 
and cultural links are very close. It can be argued that the members of the EFTA are, 
unofficially, bound to the legislation that the EP brings forward (Kux and Sverdrup 2000).  
Kux and Sverdrup argue that the EFTA is a method to keep up the myth of sovereignty while 
at the same time deepening the bonds with the EU (2000).  
 
European Parliament 
The European parliament is the parliamentary organization of the European Union. The 28 
member states are represented by 751 directly elected member states (European Parliament 
2016). The EP is arguably the strongest IPI in the world and has equal powers with the 
Council of the European Union (European Parliament 2016). It scores strong, 4-5, on all the 
PP factors except relative budget where it scores a 1. The absolute budget of the EP however 
is still the highest of all IPI’s in the world. The EP scores 0.636 on the PPI if we include the 
relative budget.  It scores 0.351 on mean legislative power The EP is an off-the line case. 
Why is the EP powerful where other European Parliaments with member states with similar 
legislative power lack behind?  
The European Parliament was not that different from the Benelux Parliament until 1979 when 
direct suffrage was introduced. When we look at the transformation of the EP into the 
powerful parliament it is now a number of reasons are given. The EU evolved from a single 
objective organization for which a supranational character was ideal: The European Coal and 
Steel Community. The supranational regulations that this organization implemented in the 
field of coal and steel influenced the energy and defense policy of Europe significantly 
(Malamud and De Sousa 2007). At the start of the European integration process supranational 
principles were more prevalent than euroscepticism.  
The Benelux countries, Italy and France all experienced strong European federalist 
movements and the Benelux showed that integration was possible. Under the direction of 
leaders like Monnet and Schuman who shared strong supranational convictions the 
community was heading in strong supranational direction (Malamud and De Sousa 2007). 
Finally, the direct elections of the parliamentarians made the EP a more powerful 
supranational organ. It led to enhanced decision making power, oversight capacities and 
democratic legitimacy (Malamud and De Sousa 2007).   
Criticism has been made on the representative functions of the EP which are mainly seen as a 
failure (Hix 2003). Especially turnout for European elections is often disappointing. These 
criticism are not unfounded and certainly do not stand alone. However in comparison to other 
IPI’s it is still remarkably effective and powerful. The EP expanded its capacities 
considerably under the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon (Noury et al. 2002). All 
main parties in the parliament are pro-European and these parties dominate the commission 
(Hix et al. 2006).  The dominance of these pro-European parties in the regional and member 
states parliaments led to the exponential growth of the powers of the European Parliament.  
PA-CSTO 
The PA-CSTO is the parliamentary assembly of the Common Security Treaty Organization. 
The members of the CSTO are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and 
Tajikistan. It emerged out of the IPA CIS in 2006 (KU Leuven 2016). The parliamentarians 
are part of national delegations that are composed out of the national parliaments (KU Leuven 
2016). The PA-CSTO discusses issues under the responsibility of the CSTO and aims to 
harmonize the security policies of the various members states (KU Leuven 2016). The CSTO 
scores the lowest score of 0.067 on the PP index. The only power is the consultative function 
on which it scores a 3. The mean legislative score of the PA CSTO member states is very low 
at 0.261 and executive power is very strong at 5.83.  
The main goal of the CSTO is to create a security regime in Central Asia by protecting its 
member states borders and sovereignty through aggregated military power (Gomtsyan 2010). 
The main member state of the organization is Russia and member countries get economic 
support from Russia in exchange for joining the CSTO. The CSTO aims to support stability in 
the region and it’s mainly occupied with security (Gomtsyan 2010).  
Security is often seen as a field wherein democratic participation and control should not be 
applied. According to this view effective foreign and security policy requires secrecy and 
flexibility, which does not fit well with the ideals of transparency and deliberative decision 
making in democratic systems (Peters et al. 2010). However, in liberal democracies 
democratic control of security policies and the armed forces is in place and is seen as one of 
the pillars of liberal democracies (Peters et al. 2010). The member states of the CSTO can 
however hardly be seen as liberal democracies with a mean democracy score of 3.545. This 
level of democracy is mimicked on a regional level. Unlike other IPI’s, promoting democracy 
and democratic legitimacy are not main goals of the CSTO. There are even studies that 
suggest that membership of the CSTO leads to a decline in democracy in its member states 
(Gomtsyan 2010). It is not likely that autocratic member states that hardly coordinate their 
security policies with their own parliaments will do this effectively on a regional level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEMAC Parliament 
The CEMAC Parliament is the parliament of the Communauté Economique et Monétaire de 
l’Afrique Centrale. This organization’s goal is to develop and deepen regional bonds by 
setting up a monetary and economic union (CEMAC 1994). The idea for a parliament was 
initiated in the 1994 founding treaty of the organization but the specifics were only worked 
out in 2004. The 60 parliamentarians are to be chosen in direct elections by the population 
(Meyer 2008). The CEMAC parliament scores 0.485 on PPI. The mean legislative score is 
quite low at 0.290 and the mean executive score is the highest of the 22 IPA’s at 6.000. With 
a high power score and low legislative score it is an off the line case. 
Although the CEMAC parliament scores relatively high on PPI some considerations need to 
be taken into account. The most important consideration is that the PPI index measures the 
formal powers of IPI’s. That is especially relevant in this case because the CEMAC 
parliament only became operational in 2010, 15 years after initially signing the treaty (IDW 
2010). The parliamentarians are still selected from national parliaments with direct elections 
planned for the long run (IDW 2010). A main problem with the CEMAC parliament, and 
other regional parliaments, is the lack of identification with the population. If even the EP has 
this problem it is hard to imagine CEMAC overcoming this problem any better in one of the 
most volatile regions in the world (Meyer 2008). That is one of the reasons that it’s hard to 
see the CEMAC Parliament as a credible defender of good governance and democratic acting 
(Meyer 2008). Furthermore a different parliament is being founded in Central Africa, the 
REPAC or Network of parliamentarian in Central Africa. This overlap is not likely to make 
the parliament powerful as it can create a “democratic fatigue” (Kissling 2011; Meyer 2008). 
Besides these arguments, the long period before the establishment of the parliament shows the 
insufficient willingness of national governments to implement supranational institutions 
(Meyer 2008).  
Comparison of the cases.  
Each of the cases differs considerably on the level of power and the mean legislative and 
executive power. As the LNA ruled out the influence of the power of the executive and 
legislative in member states, the goal of the SNA was to find an alternate theory that might 
explain the differences in IPI power. Although the LNA ruled out the influence of democratic 
norms the SNA shows that these norms remain influential in studying the power of IPI’s. The 
transfer of democratic norms from a national to a regional level can be seen in all of the four 
cases.  
The Benelux parliament has a relatively low score on the PPI but member states score high on 
mean legislative power and democracy. In the case of the Benelux it becomes clear that most 
regional democratic functions have been transferred to the EP.  The Benelux itself is highly 
linked to the EU and is mainly a deliberative platform to coordinate member state action in 
the EU. The same trend can be seen in the CEI, PABSEC and the EFTA. All of these score 
low on the PPI and member states score high on level of democracy and legislative power. 
These three IPI’s are highly connected with the EU and many of their members are also 
members of the EU or are bound to EU law. Again member states have decided that the EP is 
the most suitable regional democratic forum. It could be said that these decisions are mainly 
made because the EP is the most sophisticated IPI in Europe. Regional policy making in the 
EP is much more effective than in smaller IPI’s like the Benelux parliament and PABSEC.  
We can also see the influence of democracy in the case of the PA-CSTO. The power of this 
IPI is influenced by the reluctance of autocratic member states to have a regional democratic 
body that coordinates and oversees security matters. Strong executives block the power of the 
PA-CSTO. Finally, the CEMAC parliament is powerful on paper but in practice lacks many 
of its capacities. Member states that are dominated by the executive are unwilling to support 
supranational institutions.  
The parliament lacks identification with the population it ought to represent. Furthermore, the 
founding of an overlapping parliament, REPAC, harms the deepening of the CEMAC 
parliament’s powers.  
The theory this thesis puts forward is that democratic norms in member states do influence the 
power of IPI’s but only under certain conditions. The SNA identified a number of conditions 
that block and facilitate the influence of democratic norms. The nature of the IPI can facilitate 
the influence of democratic norms, or rather the lack of democratic norms as the case of the 
CSTO proved. The existence of a larger, more effective and overlapping IPI can block the 
influence of democratic norms as member states, driven by a fear of democratic fatigue, 
transfer regional democratic powers to this larger parliament.  Further testing needs to be done 
to find the precise effect of these conditions on the power of IPI’s.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to study if domestic power differences between the legislative and the 
executive influences the power of IPI’s. The first hypothesis stated that the power of IPI’s was 
positively influenced by the power of member states’ legislatives. The idea was that strong 
legislatives would promote democratic norms at an international level as that opened up more 
decision making opportunities for parliamentarians. The other hypothesis argued that IPI 
power is negatively influenced by the power of the executive. Undemocratic behavior of 
executives on a domestic level is replicated at an international level to maximize the gains and 
prevent scrutiny. Strong executives often bypass national parliament in international 
integration affairs, hurting the deepening and empowerment of IPI’s. The thesis used a nested 
research method to study these two hypotheses.  
This entails that first a large N analysis was conducted and on the basis of this LNA a SNA in 
the form of a case study was executed. In the LNA a linear regression model was used to 
measure the influence between the variables. For the measurement of the independent 
variables legislative power and executive power the CCP database was used. The averages of 
legislative power and executive power of the member states per IPI were used. For the 
measurement of the variable IPI power a renewed and adjusted dataset was created on the 
basis of the study of Cofelice and Stavridis (2014). The dataset included the factor relative 
budget to broaden the view on IPI power.  The outcomes of the LNA analysis did not support 
the hypotheses. The correlation between legislative power and IPI was very low and the r
2
 
was also insufficiently high. Furthermore, the results were not significant which led to the 
rejection of hypothesis I. The second hypothesis was also rejected. The results of the LNA 
showed low correlation, a low r
2 
and the results were not significant. The influence of the 
control variable ‘level of democracy' was very low and not significant. Because the scores of 
the LNA were not satisfactory the thesis continued with a model building small N analysis.  
The goal of the SNA analysis was to find a new theory that could explain differences in IPI 
power. This was done by studying two cases that scored low on the PPI in the LNA and two 
cases that scored high on the PPI. Each of the cases displayed some form of democratic norm 
transfer from a national to a regional level. Democratic states like the members of the Benelux 
have invested in the EP as a regional parliament and the relatively undemocratic members of 
the CEMAC have obstructed the creation of its parliament for a considerable time. The same 
trend can be seen in the case of the CSTO. Autocratic member states refused to give the 
CSTO parliament much power as its main tasks are related to security which is not a field in 
which non democratic states want democratic oversight.  
 
The SNA concluded by stating a new theory: IPI power is influenced by democratic norms in 
member states under certain conditions. The main conditions the SNA put forward were the 
existence of a larger, more effective and overlapping parliament and the policy field the IPI 
operates in. Further research needs to be done to test the influence of these conditions.  
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 Appendix III 
1. Measurement of budget scores 
IO Score:  
5 = > 1 Billion 
4 = > 100 Million – 1 Billion 
3 = > 50 Million – 100 Million 
2 = > 10 Million – 50 Million 
1 = < 10 Million 
 
IPI Score: 
5 = > 1 billion 
4 = >20 million – 1 billion 
3 = >10 million – 20 million 
2 = >2 million – 10 million 
1 = >500.000 – 2 million 
0 = <500.000 
 
Rel. Budget Score: 
5 = > 20% 
4 = > 10% - 20% 
3 = > 5% - 10% 
2 = > 2% - 5%  
1 = < 2% 
 
 
 
2. Budget Index 
Parliament                      Budget IO                         Budget IPI                                  Relative Budget 
EP               144.000.000.000 (5)              1.686.211.469 (5)                 1,17% (1) 
 
EALA                   97.497.884 (3)                 14.579.090 (3)                   14,95% (4) 
 
CEI                        5.250.000 (1)                         /                                      /                   
 
CPLP                      1.500.000 (1)                        /                                      /           
 
PARLACEN                 /                                 13.263.851 (3)                     /               
 
PACE                  442.255.900 (4)                        /                                       / 
 
NC                         5.360.000 (5)                   4.433.637 (2)                         82,72 (5) 
 
EFTA                  19.739.076 (2)                    1.901.333 (1)                         9.63% (3) 
 
ECOWAS          528.720.000 (4)                     /                                               / 
 
PAP                  367.260.114 (4)                   28.574.944 (4)                       7.77% (3) 
 
PARLASUR             /                                   1.705.526  (1)                           / 
 
OSCE                 141.107.600 (4)                    3.102.000 (2)                       2.2% (2) 
 
 
 Parliament                      Budget IO                         Budget IPI                                  Relative Budget 
 
BENELUX        7.956.800 (1)                          641.854 (1)                          8.1% (3) 
 
UEMOA           202.000.000 (4)                        /                                        / 
 
CEMAC            89.640.140 (3)                     8.254.338  (2)                     9.21% (3)                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix IV 
 
Table 4: Linear regression model of IPI Power including absolute budget 
                                                                  Model 3. 
(Constant)                                                      0.513 
                                                                      (0.271) 
Power of the executive                                 -0.047   
                                                                      (0.054) 
 
R
2
                                                                                                     0.036 
Adj. R
2                                                                                       
-0.012 
N                                                                          22 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
 
Table 5: Linear regression model of IPI Power including absolute Budget 
                                                                  Model 4. 
(Constant)                                                      0.079 
                                                                      (0.278) 
Power of the legislative                                 0.638   
                                                                      (0.865) 
 
R
2
                                                                                                     0.026 
Adj. R
2                                                                                       
-0.022 
N                                                                          22 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix V 
 
1. IPI power index 2016 
 
Parliament          Consultative       Oversight      Appointment     Budgetary      Legislative    Rel. Budget           PP 
EP                       4                      5                4                  5                  4               1             0.636 
 
EALA                 3                      3                0                   1                   2               4           0.348 
 
CEI                     3                       0               0                   0                  0                /            0.067 
 
PARLACEN       3                      2                1                   1                  2               /            0.333 
 
CPLP                   3                     2                 0                   0                  0               /            0.156 
 
PACE                   4                    3                  2                   1                  2              2           0.444 
 
NC                       4                     3                  0                   1                  2              5           0.394  
 
EFTA                   3                      0                  0                   0                  0             3           0.136 
 
ECOWAS            4                      2                  3                   4                   4            /            0.667 
 
PARLAND          3                      2                  0                    1                  1            /            0.244 
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CIS                       3                     0                   0                    0                  0             /          0.067 
 
PABSEC            3                       0                   0                       0               0            /           0.067 
 
PAP                    3                       2                   0                       1                2           3          0.288 
 
AR-MAGHR      3                       0                   0                       0               0           /           0.067 
 
CSTO                  3                       0                   0                       0              0          /           0.067  
 
ARAB                3                         2                   0                      1               0          /          0.200 
 
PARLASUR       4                        3                    0                     1              2          /            0.356 
 
OSCE                  3                         2                   0                     1              0           2         0.197        
 
BENELUX         2                          0                   0                     1              0           3         0.152   
 
UEMOA             3                          2                    2                    1              2            /        0.378  
 
CEMAC              4                          4                    0                    4               3            3      0.483 
  
ACCP                 3                            1                    0                   1                0            /      0.156 
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